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Recent work in judgment and decision-making has shown that a good’s price can have
irrational effects on people’s preferences. People tend to prefer goods that cost more
money and assume that such expensive goods will be more effective, even in cases where
the price of the good is itself arbitrary. Although much work has documented the existence
of these pricing effects, unfortunately little work has addressed where these price effects
come from in the first place. Here we use a comparative approach to distinguish between
different accounts of this bias and to explore the origins of these effects. Specifically,
we test whether brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) are also susceptible to pricing
effects within the context of an experimentally trained token economy. Using a capuchin
population previously trained in a token market, we explored whether monkeys used
price as an indicator of value across four experiments. Although monkeys demonstrated
an understanding of which goods had which prices (consistently shifting preferences to
cheaper goods when prices were increased), we observed no evidence that such price
information affected their valuation of different kinds of goods. These results suggest that
human pricing effects may involve more sophisticated human-unique cognitive capacities,
such as an understanding of market forces and signaling.
Keywords: pricing effects, capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella, comparative cognition, decision bias, evolutionary
origins
INTRODUCTION
Congratulations! You have just won a bottle of wine. You have
two options: a 2001 pinot noir that costs $10 or another pinot
noir from the same year that costs $50. Which do you choose?
You probably chose the more expensive wine. Indeed, when given
a choice like this, people tend to pick the most expensive options,
whether those options involve alcohol (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1971;
Plassmann et al., 2008), meat (Makens, 1964; Bello Acebrón,
and Calvo Dopico, 2000), or even cassette players (Dodds and
Monroe, 1985, see Rao and Monroe, 1989 for a review). What’s
more surprising, however, is that our preferences for more expen-
sive goods seem to hold even in cases where the price is arbitrary.
For example, Plassmann et al. (2008) allowed participants to
sample the same wine when it was labeled as either inexpen-
sive ($5 or $10) or expensive ($45 or $90). Participants reported
greater experienced pleasure for wines that were labeled as more
expensive, even though what they actually drank was the same
in both cases. These results suggest that merely labeling a good
as more expensive seems to affect the subjective utility a person
experiences from that good.
One might be tempted to write off such findings as the result
of a strange demand characteristic; perhaps participants self-
report that they enjoy expensive options more in order to signal
that they’re the kind of person who prefers expensive things.
However, some evidence suggests that pricing effects may run
deeper than mere demand characteristics. First, Plassmann et al.
(2008) found that price affected participants’ preferences at the
neural level; they found that activation in themedial orbitofrontal
cortex (mOFC)—an area of the brain thought to encode the
subjective reward utility of different stimuli (see review in Levy
and Glimcher, 2012)—was higher when participants thought the
wine was expensive than when they thought the wine was cheap.
These results suggest that participants actually experienced the
wine as tasting better when it was labeled as expensive than when
it was labeled as inexpensive. Second, pricing influences how
effective people think a good will be. Shiv et al. (2005) allowed
participants to pay different prices for energy drinks and observed
how well they performed on a set of mental acuity puzzles. People
who had paid more for the drink showed greater energy-boosting
effects than those who got the drink more cheaply (for a simi-
lar finding, see Waber et al., 2008). This result further suggests
that pricing effects appear to go beyond mere self-reported dif-
ferences in preferences; simply changing the price individuals pay
for a drink affects not only how well they think it works, but also
its actual effectiveness.
Although much work has shown that price affects people’s
expectations about a good (see also Rao and Monroe, 1989 for
a review), less work has explored how such effects emerge in the
first place. One possibility is that our expectations concerning
price information stem from our experience with how markets
operate. As any economicsmajor knows, markets tend to conform
to the rules of supply and demand. People prefer products that are
particularly good or effective, and thus demand for such effective
products should increase. Companies, therefore, will likely end up
charging more for products that are especially effective due to the
higher demand for such products. This relationship means that
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better tasting and more effective products are likely to be more
expensive. One possibility, then, is that our experience with mar-
kets causes us to develop an association between price and value;
we come to implicitly assume that expensive products must actu-
ally be valuable because otherwise sellers would have to lower
their prices. In this way, one could explain the expectations we
described above as an extension of our experience with human-
like markets. It is also possible that our experience with markets
allows us to develop more explicit theories about how markets
work—we may come to develop rich beliefs about the connec-
tion between price and value based on our own understanding of
markets. A second possibility, however, is that our expectations
about the connection between price and value have nothing to do
with our experience in markets. Instead, our preference for more
expensive items may stem from more domain-general processes,
ones that are not specific to monetary values or markets.
Are our expectations regarding price and value motivated by
a domain-general mechanism or by experience with human-like
markets? One way to distinguish between these alternatives is to
test a population that does not have rich experience with human
markets. Here, we test just such a population—capuchinmonkeys
(Cebus apella).
Although turning to capuchins may seem at first glance a
strange way to test the mechanisms underlying pricing effects
in our own species, there are several reasons why this pop-
ulation is well-suited for this question. First, researchers have
successfully used capuchins as subjects in economics studies
examining the origins of judgment and decision-making biases
(Chen et al., 2006; Egan et al., 2007, 2010; Addessi et al., 2008;
Lakshminarayanan et al., 2008, 2011). In many of these stud-
ies (e.g., Chen et al., 2006), monkeys were trained to trade
tokens with a human experimenter for different kinds of food.
Monkeys were then allowed to enter a market in which they
had to choose between different experimenters who sold dif-
ferent goods at different prices. Using this market method,
researchers have observed that capuchins appear to have many of
the same strategies and biases as humans (see review in Santos and
Chen, 2009). Like humans, capuchins exhibit endowment effects
(Lakshminarayanan et al., 2008), loss aversion (Chen et al., 2006),
reflection effects (Lakshminarayanan et al., 2011), and choice-
induced preference reversals (Egan et al., 2007, 2010). Given that
capuchins show many of the same economic biases as humans, it
makes sense to examine whether this species shows pricing biases
as well.
In addition, recent work suggests that capuchins seem to
understand some aspects of price in the context of their exper-
imental market. Chen et al. (2006) tested whether monkeys’
choices in their market obeyed the tenets of standard price the-
ory (see Becker, 1962). Capuchins were asked to allocate a set of
tokens across two different kinds of food (e.g., apples and grapes)
at a cost of one token per food item. Chen and colleagues then
introduced a compensated price shift, in which the price of one
of the goods dropped (e.g., a subject now received two apples per
token rather than one). The researchers then tested whether mon-
keys switched their consumption after this compensated price
shift; did monkeys buy more of the cheaper good after the price
change? Chen and colleagues observed that subjects attended to
price information, buying more of the cheaper good after the
price shift. These results suggest that monkeys’ choices in this
market obey standard price theory, and thus that monkeys attend
to price information in their market in some of the same ways as
human consumers do in real markets.
Because capuchins appear to understand price information
in token markets, this species can provide a particularly useful
test case for distinguishing between the two different accounts
of pricing biases described above. Although capuchins seem to
understand certain aspects of pricing information in a token
economy (e.g., Chen et al., 2006), they lack human-like experi-
ence with how price works in real markets. The capuchin token
economies differ greatly from those of human participants, par-
ticularly with regard to the connection between a good’s potential
value and its price. If human-like market experiences are indeed
necessary for the development of an association between price
and value, then capuchins should not show the same kinds of
pricing effects as humans do.
In the current studies, we developed a series of experiments
to determine whether capuchins show human-like price biases.
Capuchin subjects were taught the price of two novel foods in the
context of their token economy (see Chen et al., 2006). We then
assessed monkeys’ preferences for the two goods in the absence
of tokens (i.e., during free choice). If monkeys exhibit human-
like pricing effects, then they should prefer the more expensive
good to the cheaper good when they have a chance to freely choose
without paying with their tokens.
Experiment 1 began by teaching capuchins prices for two new
foods: differently colored flavored ices. We then allowed monkeys
to freely choose between the two colors and tested whether they
spontaneously preferred the good that we had told themwasmore
expensive.
EXPERIMENT 1
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We tested seven brown capuchin monkeys (AG, AH, FL, HR,
MD,MP, NN) from the population at the Comparative Cognition
Laboratory at Yale University (New Haven, CT). All mon-
keys had participated in a variety of experiments involving
making decisions in their token economy (Chen et al., 2006;
Lakshminarayanan et al., 2008, 2011). All studies were approved
by the Yale Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee.
Testing was conducted in a cubical testing chamber (75× 75×
75 cm), which monkeys entered via a sliding door attached to
their main large social enclosure. Only one monkey was allowed
into the testing area at a time. Monkeys were free to walk into an
adjacent section of the enclosure during testing where no other
monkeys were present. Two panels on opposite sides of the testing
enclosure allowed participants to interact with the experimenters.
Each of the panels had two trading holes (5× 9 cm), spaced such
that the participants could reach through one but not both of the
openings at the same time (approximately 25 cm apart). During
testing, subjects were allowed to choose different foods presented
on a small table with a sliding component that was hooked to
the outside of the testing enclosure. The sliding component had
two trays each positioned to line up with a trading hole when
slid up to the chamber, allowing the subject easy access to their
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contents. Monkeys were presented with 12 tokens (1 inch diam-
eter aluminum disks) which they could use to “purchase” small
Flavor-Ice ice chunks (2.5× 1 cm) of different colors (orange and
blue).
Before testing began, each monkey was given one piece of
each ice color in order to familiarize them with the taste. The
order of color presentation was counterbalanced across monkeys.
After familiarization with the different flavors, monkeys began the
study. All monkey subjects began on an initial preference phase,
followed by a price learning phase, and then a preference assessment
phase (see Figure 1 for more details).
In the initial preference phase, subjects were given a choice
between equal quantities of the blue and orange ice. The goal of
this phase was to assess monkeys’ initial preference between the
two colors of ice. We also wanted to be sure that monkeys did not
have strong aversion to one ice color; those monkeys who showed
significant preferences were removed from the study. Note that
because we did not introduce any tokens during this phase, mon-
keys had the chance to sample the ices before learning about their
prices. During each trial, monkeys were given a choice between
the two ices. To do so, the experimenter slid the sliding compo-
nent away from the testing chamber, placed each piece of ice on
its respective tray, and then pushed the sliding component back
to allow the subject to choose. The subject then selected one of
the two ices; after the subject made its choice, the sliding compo-
nent was withdrawn and the other ice was removed. We presented
subjects with two sessions of 12 trials each, with ice placement
counterbalanced across trials. Sessions were run on separate days
in order to prevent ice satiation.
After the initial preference phase, subjects moved on to the
price learning phase. The goal of this phase was to use the token
economy to teach monkeys that one of the two goods could be
bought at a discount relative to the other. On each trial, mon-
keys had a chance to give a token to an experimenter who would
return either one piece of one color of ice (the expensive ice), or
three pieces of the other color of ice (the cheap ice). Note that
the expensive color of ice was priced at three times the price of
the cheap color of ice. We chose this difference in price because
previous work has shown that monkeys are able to distinguish
items that are three times the value of other items (e.g., vanMarle
et al., 2006). We conservatively chose which ice was cheaper based
on monkeys’ initial preferences; monkeys who indicated an initial
preference for orange ice (AG, FL, MD) were taught that orange
ice was cheap while those that indicated a preference for blue ice
(AH, HR, MP, NN) were taught that blue ice was cheap. Testing
proceeded as in previous token trading procedures (e.g., Chen
et al., 2006; Lakshminarayanan et al., 2008). Specifically, subjects
could “purchase” one of the two ices by placing a token into the
hand of an experimenter. At the start of each trial, the experi-
menter placed his hand open to receive themonkey’s token. At the
same time, he displayed a small dish holding the amount of ice to
be traded. Upon receiving a token from the monkey, the experi-
menter brought the dish up to allow the monkey access. Once the
monkey had eaten all the ice, the dish was reloaded, and the next
trial began. Each monkey received two sessions of 12 trials with
the order of the first color counterbalanced across sessions.
Following the price learning phase, monkeys moved on to the
preference assessment phase. The goal of this phase was to see if
FIGURE 1 | Description of different experimental conditions and phases.
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learning the price of the two ices affected the monkeys’ prefer-
ences for each of the two colors. To test this, we gave the monkeys
a free choice between the two colors (i.e., they could take the ices
without having to purchase them using their tokens). The pref-
erence assessment phase was identical to the initial preference
phase; monkeys again received a free choice between the two col-
ors on the sliding trays. Importantly, the experimenter presenting
the trays to the monkey was blind to which ice color had been
cheap and which had been expensive, and thus could not influ-
ence the monkeys’ choices. Assuming monkeys were indifferent
between the two ice colors initially, we could test whether mon-
keys show human-like price effects by examining whether they
reliably chose the color shown to be more expensive in the price
learning phase when choosing in the preference assessment phase.
RESULTS
We first tested to see if monkeys had an initially strong preference
for one of the two colors of ice in the initial preference phase. Two
of the monkeys showed a strong and significant initial preference
(HG: 12.5%, p = 0.0003, JM: 25.0%, p = 0.02) and thus were
dropped from further testing. All other monkeys did not show
a significant preference (FL: 29.2%, p < 0.064; AG: 37.5%, p =
0.31; AH: 41.7%, p = 0.54; HR: 50.0%, p = 1.00, MD: 37.5%,
p = 0.31; MP: 29.2%, p < 0.064; NN: 41.7%, p = 0.54; all tests
exact binomial probability estimates against chance), suggesting
that these subjects had no initial preference between the two
colors and thus could be used as subjects in the subsequent
phases.
Monkeys then went on to learn about the price of the two ices
during the price learning phase. Note that in this phase monkeys
had no choices—they received equal numbers of trades across the
cheap and expensive goods. After learning about the prices, we
again tested the monkeys’ preferences in the preference assess-
ment phase. Specifically, we compared monkeys’ preference for
the expensive color in the test condition with their preference
for that color before they learned the price information. To do
this, we used a repeated measures ANOVA with the color used
as expensive as a between subject variable (orange or blue) and
time of choice as a within subject variable (before price informa-
tion and after price information). We observed no main effect of
color [F(1, 5) = 0.328, p = 0.591], suggesting that monkeys had
no strong preference for one color over another.We also, however,
observed no main effect of timing [F(1, 5) = 0.527, p = 0.50].
Monkeys’ preferences did not change after learning that one item
was more expensive. Non-parametric tests confirmed this finding
that there was no effect of price training (Wilcoxon signed rank:
Z = 0.94, p = 0.35). We also observed no interaction between
color and price [F(1, 5) = 0.004, p = 0.95].
DISCUSSION
In Experiment 1, we taught monkeys that one color of ice was
three times more expensive than the other, and explored whether
monkeys subsequently preferred the more expensive kind of ice
when they had free access to both options. In contrast to what’s
often been observed in humans (Plassmann et al., 2008), monkeys
showed no preference for the more expensive ice. Learning which
kind of ice was more expensive in the price learning phase did not
seem to affect monkeys’ preferences in the preference assessment
phase. This result suggests that learning that a food is expensive
doesn’t seem to make monkeys like it more.
There are, however, a few problems with this study. The first
concerns whether monkeys noticed the differential pricing of the
two goods. Previous work has shown that this population of
capuchins understands the “price” of different goods when such
goods are sold in different amounts for a single token (Chen et al.,
2006). Experiment 1 assumed that similar presentations of differ-
ent amounts of food would teach monkeys the specific price of
each good. It is possible, though, that monkeys did not attend to
this information. In Experiment 2, we add a control condition to
test that monkeys attended to the pricing information, testing the
monkeys on a price shift condition similar to that used in Chen
et al. (2006)’s original study.
A second potential flaw in Experiment 1 is that sampling
a food may establish a preference that doesn’t change once
new price information is learned. In Experiment 1, we first
exposed monkeys to both flavors of ice in order to obtain a
baseline for their preferences. Unfortunately, it is possible that
this experience allowed monkeys to establish a preference that
could not be changed by price information. In Experiment 2,
we directly explore this possibility by varying whether mon-
keys had previous experience with the foods whose prices were
being manipulated. This manipulation allowed us to examine
whether prior experience anchored preferences and contributed
to the fact that we did not observe a human-like pricing bias
in Experiment 1.
EXPERIMENT 2
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We tested 8 capuchins (AG, AH, FL, HG, HR, JM, MP, NN) from
the same colony. All but two monkeys (HG and JM) had previ-
ously participated in Experiment 1. One monkey who was tested
in Experiment 1 (MD) was not included in this study due to a
disinterest in entering the enclosure for testing during the period
when this study was run.
We used the same testing enclosure as in Experiment 1, but
with a couple of key differences. Instead of using flavored ice as
in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 used pieces of differently flavored
Jell-O brand gelatin (roughly 1 cm across and 0.65 cm deep). To
standardize the shapes of the gelatin, we made each piece using
a standard mold. We used six different color/flavor/shape combi-
nations (pink watermelon squares, purple grape crescents, green
lime stars, blue blueberry hearts, red strawberry clovers, and yel-
low lemon triangles). Hereafter each gelatin will be referred to
by color. Gelatin colors and experimenter were counterbalanced
across subjects.
The procedure of Experiment 2 was similar to that of
Experiment 1 except that (1) we explicitly varied the exposure
monkeys had to the gelatin and (2) we included a condition to
directly test whether monkeys encoded the price information in
this study. Each monkey was run on three separate conditions:
first, an exposure condition and a non-exposure condition (pre-
sented in a counterbalanced order) followed by a price shift control
condition (see Figure 1 for more details). In both the exposure
and non-exposure conditions, monkeys would ultimately get a
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choice between two colors of gelatin, one which was shown to be
expensive and one which was shown to be cheap.
In the exposure condition, monkeys began with the expo-
sure phase, consisting of two sessions. The goal of this phase
was to allow the monkeys to systematically taste each of the
two gelatin colors. On each trial, monkeys interacted with an
experimenter who handed them a single color of gelatin. During
each trial, the experimenter began by positioning herself outside
either side of the test enclosure, displaying a small dish holding
the gelatin to be delivered. The experimenter then brought the
dish up to the trading hole, allowing the monkey full access to
its contents. Once the monkey had eaten the gelatin, the dish
would be reloaded, and the next trial would begin. Each mon-
key received two sessions of 12 trials (6 for each color gelatin)
with the order of the first color gelatin given counterbalanced
across sessions.
After subjects completed the exposure phase, theymoved on to
a price learning phase, identical to that of Experiment 1, in which
subjects were taught the prices for two colors of gelatin (either
blue vs. green or red vs. yellow depending on the counterbalance).
In this phase, capuchins participated in a series of five sessions of
12 trials. Each monkey was taught that one color was cheap (i.e.,
they received three pieces of that color gelatin for a single token),
while the other color was expensive (i.e., they received only one
piece of gelatin for a token).
After learning the price of the new goods, capuchins then were
given a preference assessment phase, similar to the one used in
Experiment 1, in which subjects were allowed to freely choose
between the two colors of gelatin for which they had just learned
prices in the price learning phase. Monkeys received 5 sessions of
12 trials. On each trial, monkeys interacted with an experimenter,
blind to the nature of the cheap and expensive gelatin goods, who
held two small dishes, each containing a colored gelatin piece. The
experimenter then simultaneously brought each dish to a sepa-
rate trading hole, and allowed the monkey to choose one. After
the monkey chose the color to consume, the other dish was with-
drawn, and the trays were reloaded. Again, the goal of this phase
was to determine which of the two flavors the monkeys preferred
when they got to freely choose, and to see if price information
affected that preference.
In the non-exposure condition, monkeys proceeded through
exactly the same phases as in the exposure condition except
that we did not include the exposure phase; monkeys only went
through a price learning phase and a preference assessment phase.
In this way, monkeys in the non-exposure condition had never
been exposed to the two novel gelatin colors when they first
learned about the gelatins’ prices in the price learning phase. If
previous exposure to the novel foods had anchored the monkeys’
initial preferences in Experiment 1, then wouldn’t expect a simi-
lar effect here since the goods were totally novel at the point the
monkeys learned their prices.
After subjects completed both the exposure condition and the
non-exposure condition, they then moved on to the price shift
control condition. The goal of this condition was to be sure that
monkeys learned the different prices. We used a version of the
price shift studies used in Chen et al. (2006): monkeys were
presented with an initial purchasing preference phase (to test the
monkeys initial preferences between two colors of gelatin when
those colors were the same price), a price shift training phase (in
which we taught the monkeys a new price for one of the two
goods), and a price shift assessment phase (to see whether themon-
keys responded rationally to this shift in price and allocated their
budget accordingly).
The initial purchasing preference phase involved assessing the
monkeys’ initial preferences between the two colors of gelatin
being offered when monkeys got equal amounts of the two col-
ors for a single token. Monkeys received five sessions of 12 trials
each, with one session run per day. At the beginning of each
session, the subject monkey was given 12 tokens with which to
buy the gelatin. Experimenters positioned themselves on oppo-
site sides of the testing chamber. One experimenter consistently
dispensed pink gelatin, while the other dispensed purple. Both
experimenters began the session with their backs facing the mon-
key. Then, on a synchronized count, both turned around, offering
one hand toward a trading hole to receive a token from the mon-
key, and displaying the gelatin that they offered in the other hand.
The monkey was then able to choose the color he preferred by
depositing a token in one of the experimenters’ hands. The chosen
experimenter then presented his tray up to the trading hole so that
the monkey could reach the gelatin while the other experimenter
would turn his back around in order to indicate that they were no
longer available for trade. After the gelatin was completely con-
sumed, experimenters would reload their trays, switch sides and
proceed with the next trial. Gelatin colors were counterbalanced
across monkeys.
After we had taught monkeys that the two kinds of gelatin
were equal in price, subjects moved into the price shift training
phase. Here the monkeys learned that the prices that they were
originally exposed to had changed. Specifically, the good that
the subject had liked least (purple: AG, AH, HG, HR; pink: FL,
JM, MP, NN) was discounted such that one token went from
buying a single piece of gelatin to buying three pieces. As in
the initial assessment, monkeys were given 12 tokens to allow
them to purchase gelatin from the two experimenters. However,
in this case monkeys did not have a choice; on each trial, only
one experimenter was available to trade. Both experimenters
began each trial with their backs to the testing chamber, but
only one experimenter turned at a time, thus providing only
one person with whom the monkey could trade. One exper-
imenter offered three pieces of the “discounted” gelatin for a
single token, while the other offered the original price of one
gelatin piece per token. Each monkey received three sessions
of this training before moving onto the price shift assessment
phase.
In the price shift assessment phase, we tested whether mon-
keys responded to the change in price they just witnessed by
switching their consumption to the cheaper good (see Chen et al.,
2006 for another version of this price-shift test). The assess-
ment was similar to the initial purchasing preference phase except
that monkeys had a choice of the two gelatin colors now at
the new prices. If monkeys accurately attend to and track price,
they should switch their consumption to the less costly good in
this assessment phase. Each monkey completed 5 sessions of 12
trials.
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RESULTS
We first analyzed how monkeys performed on the price shift
assessment as compared to the initial purchasing preference
phase. Did subjects successfully understand the more expensive
price and therefore choose the cheaper good when they had to pay
for it? To test this, we ran a repeated measures ANOVA with price
(initial purchasing preference phase with equally priced goods vs.
price shift assessment where one good was more expensive) as a
within subjects factor and color of good chosen to be cheap (pink
or purple) as a between subjects factor. We observed no effect
of color [F(1, 6) = 0.25, p = 0.879]. We did however observe a
significant main effect of price [F(1, 6) = 123.85, p < 0.0001].
Although monkeys overall didn’t have a preference for either
color initially [t(7) = 0.944, p = 0.377], monkeys preferred the
cheaper good after the price change [81.0% preference for the
cheap good: t(7) = 5.89, p < 0.0006]. All monkeys spent more on
the cheap color after the price shift than before it (Paired sign
test: p = 0.0078). We also observed a small interaction of color
and price [F(1, 6) = 7.67, p = 0.03]; monkeys showed more of a
shift toward the cheaper good when pink was the cheap good than
when purple was the cheap good. Overall, these results demon-
strate that subjects recognized the price at which each color
gelatin was being offered and attended to this information in their
choices. Importantly, all monkeys consumed more of the cheaper
good after the price shift as one might expect given standard price
theory (see Chen et al., 2006).
We then tested whether monkeys chose the expensive good
above chance in the preference assessment phases of the exposure
and non-exposure conditions. As in Experiment 1, we observed
no effect of price in Experiment 2; monkeys chose the expensive
good on average 53.1% of trials [One-sample t-test: t(7) = 0.431,
p = 0.68]. This chance-level performance was true for both the
blue/green color combination [48.5% choice to expensive, t(7) =
0.26, p = 0.80] and the red/yellow color combination [57.7%
choice to expensive, t(7) = 0.718, p = 0.50]. Despite the fact that
monkeys robustly understood price in the price shift control,
that information didn’t seem to affect their preferences or how
much they valued each kind of gelatin when they got to freely
choose one.
We also looked to see whether initial experience affected the
magnitude of price effects using a repeated measures ANOVA
with exposure level (exposure condition vs. non-exposure condi-
tion) as a within subject factor and the color combination subjects
had experience with (blue/green vs. red/yellow) as a between sub-
jects factor. We observed no effect of experience [F(1, 6) = 1.198,
p = 0.316]; subjects showed just as strong a preference for the
expensive good in the exposure condition (Mean = 57.9% pref-
erence for the expensive good) as they did in the non-exposure
condition (48.3%).
DISCUSSION
We had two goals in Experiment 2. Our first was to confirm that
monkeys attended to the prices that we had presented. To do this,
we performed a price shift like that of Chen et al. (2006), changing
the price of one color of gelatin to a “sale price” that was three
times cheaper than the price of the other gelatin. Our subjects
overwhelmingly purchased more of the cheaper gelatin, as they
had done in previously published studies (Chen et al., 2006). This
result indicates that capuchin monkeys do attend to the price of
the goods presented in this token exchange market. In addition,
this result also demonstrates that monkeys use price as a factor in
their purchasing decisions in this experimental market.
The second goal of Experiment 2 was to examine the role of
prior experience in themonkey’s preferences—specifically, to find
out whether prior experience may have moderated any effect that
price may have on preferences. Regardless of exposure, capuchins
did not prefer the more expensive good; as in Experiment 1,
no monkey showed a preference for either the cheap or expen-
sive good. This new result indicates that monkeys’ lack of a
preference for the more expensive good in Experiment 1 is not
because of anchoring due to prior exposure. Instead, the results
of Experiment 2 suggest that regardless of whether monkeys have
previous experience with a particular food, capuchins base their
preferences on their subjective experience with a food, rather than
any external price information.
A possible issue with Experiments 1 and 2 is that both stud-
ies used foods that were different colors and—perhaps more
importantly—different flavors. It is possible that price infor-
mation did not influence monkeys preferences in these studies
because monkeys may have had slight (although not statistically
significant) preferences based on the colors and flavors of the
foods we offered them. These initial preferences may have over-
shadowed any changes in valuation that occurred due to differ-
ences in price. The results of Experiments 1 and 2 therefore leave
open the possibility that monkeys may prefer the more expen-
sive of two perfectly equal goods. To examine this, Experiment 3
tested monkeys’ preferences for differently priced yet perceptu-
ally identical foods, just as has been done in human pricing effect
experiments (e.g., Plassmann et al., 2008). To do so, we used two
of the same kind of food (pieces of Kix cereal) to ensure that
the two goods were perfectly equal. However, to be sure that the
individual foods were distinguishable in some way, we paired the
pieces of cereal with novel “brand” logos. In this way, Experiment
3 was able to allow monkeys to choose between foods which
would be identical in perceptual experience (i.e., taste) yet could
have different prices.
Experiment 3 also aimed to explore whether any other factors
could affect monkeys’ preferences for different foods. Given that
monkeys failed to show pricing effects in Experiments 1 and 2, we
hoped to find another factor that could affect monkeys’ prefer-
ences even if this species lacks pricing effects. One external factor
that is unrelated to price but appears to play a role in humans’
reward preferences is the wait time that comes with different
rewards. Although we tend to dislike waiting for a reward (e.g.,
Berns et al., 2007) and find long wait times very costly, we also find
rewards more enjoyable if we have to wait longer for them (e.g.,
Alessandri et al., 2008a). This so-called “delay justification effect”
has also been observed in 7 year-old children, who also prefer a
stimulus that usually follows a delay to a stimulus that usually
does not follow a delay (Alessandri et al., 2008b). Although there
is some controversy about the mechanisms underlying these delay
justification effects (see Festinger, 1957 vs. Zentall, 2010), it seems
clear that our tendency to overvalue stimuli that are associated
with longer delays may be part of a larger, more general tendency
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to prefer stimuli associated with more cost or effort, regardless
of whether such effort comes in the form of extra waiting (e.g.,
Alessandri et al., 2008a), more difficult work (e.g., Festinger and
Carlsmith, 1959), or even more embarrassment (e.g., Aronson
and Mills, 1959).
Interestingly, humans are not the only species to experience
delay and other forms of effort justification effects. Recent com-
parative work suggests that some non-human species also prefer a
stimulus associated with additional cost or effort (Clement et al.,
2000; Kacelnik and Marsh, 2002; Friedrich and Zentall, 2004;
Gipson et al., 2009), particularly in cases when delays are involved
(DiGian et al., 2004; Pompilio and Kacelnik, 2005; Zentall and
Singer, 2007; Wanat et al., 2010; see Zentall, 2010 for a review).
For example, DiGian et al. (2004) presented pigeons with two
stimuli that predicted an immediate reward: one stimulus was
available immediately and one stimulus appeared only after a 6 s
delay. When given a choice between these two reinforcing stimuli,
pigeons reliably preferred the stimulus that appeared after a delay
even though it predicted the same kind of reward as the stimulus
that was available immediately. This result suggests that pigeons
find a stimulus more rewarding if they have to wait longer for
it. In this way, other species appear to value goods more highly
the longer they have to wait for them1 . We therefore wanted
to see whether capuchins might use delay as an extrinsic fac-
tor that mediated their preferences for different kinds of foods,
even though they don’t incorporate price information into their
preferences.
Experiment 3 tested whether varying either a food’s wait-time
or its price would affect monkeys’ preferences when freely choos-
ing between different options. The similarity between these two
dimensions—delay and price—allowed us to set up two method-
ologically identical studies testing each of these factors. We taught
monkeys about two novel brands’ prices (one piece for one token
or three pieces for one token) or wait times (available after 30 s
or immediately available) through repeated exposure, and then
allowed the monkeys to choose between the two brands. If longer
delays affected capuchins’ preferences more so than higher prices,
then monkeys should prefer brands that come after a long delay
even though they show no preferences across differently priced
brands. This type of effect would imply that capuchins’ prefer-
ences in a token economy can in fact be influenced by extrinsic
properties, but that price information is not one of these proper-
ties. On the other hand, if the capuchins show neither delay nor
price effects, this finding would suggest that capuchins may evalu-
ate goods based entirely on their subjective experience with them,
rather than any additional extrinsic features.
1Nonetheless, there does exist a number of studies suggesting that human
and non-human animals do not always show delay and other effort justifi-
cation effects (Vasconcelos et al., 2007; Arantes and Grace, 2008; Shibasaki
and Kawai, 2008, 2011; Vasconcelos and Urcuioli, 2009). For example, in one
experiment, Shibasaki and Kawai (2008) observed that people prefer stim-
uli that follow low-effort tasks than those that follow high-effort tasks. These
authors found a similar pattern in Japanese macaques (Shibasaki and Kawai,
2011) in a task in which different stimuli appeared after different numbers of
touchscreen presses. Like humans, macaques appeared to show a reverse effort
justification effect, statistically preferring the stimulus associated with the least
effort over the one associated with the most.
EXPERIMENT 3
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects were 7 adult brown capuchin monkeys (AH, FL, HG,
HR, JM, MD, NN) from the same colony. Two monkeys who
had previously participated in both Experiments 1 and 2 were
excluded from Experiment 3: one low-ranking monkey (AG) was
not included due to social problems in the colony during the time
of testing, while another monkey (MP) was not included due to a
disinterest in entering the enclosure for testing during the period
when this experiment was run.
Experiment 3 used pieces of Kix cereal (General Mills, US)—
a familiar food for these subjects—as a reward. To differentiate
between the cheap and expensive versions of the cereal, we cre-
ated three pairs of “brands” which were denoted by three easily
distinguishable pairs of symbols: red flower vs. yellow star, green
clover vs. yellow moon, and orange balloon vs. blue horseshoe.
These brand symbols (approximately 13× 13 cm) were displayed
prominently on the white shirt of the experimenter that consis-
tently offered that brand. The brand symbol was also displayed
on the container (a 3 oz clear plastic drinking cup with the front
half cut out to make food easily reachable) from which the cereal
was dispensed. Each experimenter presented the cups to the mon-
key on white foamcore platforms that were covered in white duct
tape for ease of cleaning. Each cup always contained a single
piece of cereal, but each platform could hold one to three cups
depending on condition. We attached the cups to the platform
using Velcro to keep them stable. Each monkey always saw the
same experimenter associated with each brand, but the brand and
experimenter were counterbalanced across monkeys.
Each monkey participated in three conditions: a price shift
control condition, a delay condition and a price condition (see
Figure 1 for more details). The price shift control condition was
administered first, with the delay and price conditions presented
afterwards in a counterbalanced order.
The price shift control condition, which was nearly identical
to the price shift control condition used in Experiment 2, was
used to ensure that monkeys could attend to price information
in the context of the branded cups used in Experiment 3. If mon-
keys are able to accurately track the prices of brands, then—as in
Experiment 2—they should buy more of the cheaper brand after
the price shift. After all of the monkeys had completed the price
shift control, demonstrating that they were paying attention to
the price of the cups and using this price information to make
decisions, they then moved on to either the price condition or the
delay condition (in a counterbalanced order).
As in the non-exposure condition of Experiment 2, the price
condition consisted of two phases: a price learning phase (where
monkeys were exposed to the prices of two new brands), and
price preference assessment phase (where monkeys were allowed
to choose between the two brands in the absence of price). The
goal of the price learning phase was to expose the monkeys to the
prices of two new brands of cups. One of the two brands was
cheap (i.e., one token could purchase three cups with one piece
of Kix each), while the other was expensive (i.e., one token could
purchase only one cup with one piece of Kix). Note that this is
identical to the procedure used for different goods in Experiments
1 and 2, except that we used different brands instead of different
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foods. Monkeys each received four sessions, each consisting of 16
trials each. In each trial, the two branded experimenters dropped
a token into the enclosure in unison, before moving to opposite
sides of the enclosure. Then one of the two experimenters turned
around, offering to trade the contents of her cup(s) in exchange
for a token. After the monkey paid one of the two experimenters
and received the food, the two experimenters switched sides and
repeated the process.
Monkeys then moved on to the price preference assessment
phase. The goal of this phase was to determine whether capuchins
changed their preference for the two brands based on the price
information they had just been taught. Each price preference ses-
sion began with four price reminder trials identical to the original
price learning trials.We added these reminder trials to be sure that
monkeys accurately remembered which brand was which. After
these reminder trials, a different experimenter (who was blind
to condition) gave the monkeys a choice between the two dif-
ferent branded cups in the absence of any tokens. Importantly,
in this case, each branded cup only contained a single piece of
Kix. If monkeys had developed a preference for a specific brand
based on the pricing information, then they should selectively
choose that preferred brand when given a free choice to eat food
from either brand. Monkeys received four sessions of 16 trials
each. If capuchins use price as an indicator of quality, then they
should selectively prefer the previously expensive brand (the one
for which they had previously been offered one cup for a sin-
gle token) to the previously cheap brand (the one for which they
previously received three cups for a single token).
The delay condition mirrored the price condition with one key
difference: instead of varying the price of the two brands, we
instead varied the time the monkeys needed to wait in order to
receive each brand. Like the price condition, the delay condition
involved two phases: a delay learning phase and a delay prefer-
ence assessment phase. The delay learning phase served to teach
the monkeys that one brand was associated with a delay and
one was not. Specifically, one of the two brands (the “expensive
delay” brand) was associated with a 30 s delay while the other
brand (the “cheap delay” brand) was given immediately. Each
monkey received four 16-trial sessions. On each trial, the two
branded experimenters dropped a token into the enclosure in
unison before moving to opposite sides. Then, one of the two
experimenters turned around, offering to trade with the monkey.
When the monkey gave a token to the experimenter holding the
cheap brand, she moved her cup toward the trading hole imme-
diately, allowing the monkey to immediately retrieve the piece of
Kix in the cup. In contrast, when the monkey gave a token to
the experimenter holding the expensive brand, she waited 30 s
before moving her cup toward the trading hole, thus requiring
the monkey to wait before retrieving the piece of Kix in the cup.
Following the delay learning phase, monkeys moved on to the
delay preference assessment phase. The goal of delay preference
assessment phase was to determine whether the relative cost of the
two brands in terms of time had affected themonkeys’ preferences
between the two. The structure of these sessions was identical to
the sessions presented in the price preference assessment phase
except that we varied the brands’ delay times rather than prices.
During each trial, an experimenter who was blind to which brand
had previously been associated with the delay turned to face the
enclosure, offering a cup from one of the brands at each of the
two trading holes. If capuchins come to value brands that are
associated with a greater wait time, then they should selectively
prefer the brand that was previously associated with the delay
over the brand that was previously available immediately. On the
other hand, if capuchins do not use increased delay as an indica-
tor of quality, then they should show no preference in the delay
preference assessment phase.
RESULTS
We first explored whether monkeys had an initial preference for
one of the two brands in the price condition when they initially
encountered them in purchasing preference phase. None of the
seven monkeys showed a statistically significant preference across
the two brands (percent choice to the brand that would later be
made cheap: HR: 48%, p = 0.90; FL: 48%, p = 0.90; NN: 42%,
p = 0.26; MD: 38%, p = 0.059, JM: 41%, p = 0.17; HG: 47%,
p = 0.71, AH: 50%, p = 1.00).
After the price shift, however, all the monkeys developed a
significant preference for the cheaper of the two brands: (HR:
98%, p < 0.0001, FL: 97%, p < 0.0001; NN: 94%,<0.0001; MD:
98%,<0.0001; JM: 95%,<0.0001; HG: 95%,<0.0001; AH: 70%,
p = 0.0016). A paired t-test revealed that monkeys as a group pre-
ferred the cheaper brand when using their currency [t(6) = 9.83,
p < 0.0001]. Again, this result suggests that monkeys do use price
information when distinguishing between brands, actively shift-
ing their consumption to the cheaper brand when they need to
pay tokens to obtain it.
Given that all monkeys correctly paid attention to the price of
these brands of cups, we then explored whether teaching mon-
keys that the brands had different prices had an effect on their
preferences for each brand. Unfortunately, three subjects did not
fully complete testing due to social problems in the enclosure. We
therefore ran our analysis on just the four monkeys that com-
pleted all the tests. As in previous experiments, we presented
monkeys with two new brands and tested whether monkeys chose
the more expensive one above chance in the price preference
assessment phase. We again saw no effect of price on monkeys’
preferences. As in all previous experiments, no monkeys showed
a significant preference for the expensive brand over the cheap
brand (percent choice to expensive brand: HR: 50%, p = 1.0, FL:
48%, p = 0.90; NN: 48%, p = 0.90; MD: 53%, p = 0.71).
We then tested whether monkeys showed a preference for
delay—whether they chose the expensive delayed brand above
chance in the delay preference assessment phase. Interestingly, we
also saw no significant preferences for the brand with the expen-
sive delay. Onemonkey, HR, did show a significant preference, but
her pattern of performance went in the opposite direction than we
hypothesized—HR significantly preferred the immediately avail-
able cheap brand (20%, p < 0.0001). All other monkeys chose
between the immediate and delayed brand at chance (FL: 47%,
p = 0.71; NN: 48, p = 0.90; MD: 55%, p = 0.53).
DISCUSSION
Experiment 3 had two main goals. The first goal was to exam-
ine whether using two goods that are experientially identical
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but perceptually distinguishable would cause monkeys to show
a price preference that they do not otherwise show. In contrast
to Experiments 1 and 2, which used different flavors of the same
food, Experiment 3 used identical cereal pieces as the reward for
both the expensive and cheap options. In spite of this change,
monkeys still showed no preference between the two brands dur-
ing price preference assessment trials. Importantly, all monkeys
successfully switched to the cheaper good when it went on “sale,”
again indicating that they were attending to the price information
we had shown them. This finding implies that the monkeys’ lack
of preference in the first two experiments is likely not due to dif-
ferences in the two foods being offered, as monkeys’ failure to use
price as an indicator of value persists even when identical items
are offered as goods.
The second goal of Experiment 3 was to explore whether any
factors could affect monkeys’ preferences for different foods. To
this end, we explored whether the amount of time monkeys were
required to wait for one brand over the other affected their pref-
erences. Rather than teaching monkeys different prices, the delay
condition of Experiment 3 taught the monkeys that they had to
pay different costs in terms of time. We found that monkeys did
not show a preference for the good previously associated with a
delay. This finding shows that the use of delay as a cue to qual-
ity may not be as robust as some previous studies had suggested
(DiGian et al., 2004; Pompilio and Kacelnik, 2005; Zentall and
Singer, 2007; Wanat et al., 2010; see Zentall, 2010 for a review). In
this context, it seems that capuchins use neither price nor delay as
cues to quality.
Our use of Kix cereal in Experiment 3 had one important
drawback. This cereal was already quite familiar to our subjects,
as it had previously been used in a number of experiments in the
lab. Although Experiment 2 established that prior exposure to a
food does not affect monkeys’ preferences in terms of price effects,
we still worried that it might be difficult for monkeys to think of
this food differently based on its brand since it was so familiar to
them previously. To solve this issue, Experiment 4 used the same
approach as Experiment 3, but with a novel kind of food: Crunch
Berries cereal (Quaker Oats, US). The Crunch Berries offer a cou-
ple of major advantages over Kix. First, this cereal is available
in four colors (red, green, blue, and purple) giving us the abil-
ity to make the two different brands perceptually different and
thus easier to discriminate. However, all four of colors of Crunch
Berries taste the same; in this way, there is no reason that sub-
jects should form a strong preference for one color over another.
Second, our subject monkeys had no outside experience with
Crunch Berries, and thus we were able to ensure that the mon-
keys’ only knowledge of differences between the colors and brands
was acquired during the exposure they received during training
and testing.
In addition to using a different food reward, Experiment 4 also
aimed to be sure that monkeys were able to distinguish between
the two brands and make choices based on them. We there-
fore added more reminder trials at the beginning of each testing
session to be sure that the monkeys remembered which brand
was cheap vs. expensive and which brand required a delay. To
determine whether the monkeys were accurately tracking brands
in both the price and delay conditions, we also added a set
of manipulation checks to ensure the monkeys were accurately
tracking which brand was associated with a higher price/delay.
EXPERIMENT 4
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects were 6 adult brown capuchin monkeys (FL, HG, HR,
JM, MD, NN). Five of the monkeys tested (FL, HG, HR, JM,
NN) had previously participated in Experiment 3. Two monkeys
(HG, MD) who participated in Experiment 3 were excluded from
Experiment 4 due a disinterest in entering the enclosure for test-
ing during the period when this study was run. Onemonkey (MP)
participated in Experiments 1 and 2, but not in Experiment 3.
We used four Crunch Berry cereal colors (red, blue, green, pur-
ple) as goods; these colors all tasted the same so monkey should
not have had any preferences for colors based on the flavor. We
again associated each reward color with an individual “brand”
using symbols: red Crunch Berries with a red flag, blue Crunch
Berries with a blue sun, purple Crunch Berries with a purple
teardrop, and green Crunch Berries with a green snowflake. The
brand used in each condition and the experimenter associated
with each brand were counterbalanced across monkeys. As in
Experiment 3, brands were displayed both on the experimenter’s
shirt, and the cups containing the Crunch Berries.
In Experiment 4, each monkey participated in 2 conditions:
a price condition and a delay condition (see Figure 1 for more
details). As in previous experiments, the price condition began
with two phases: a price learning phase (where monkeys were
exposed to the prices associated with two brands), and a price pref-
erence assessment phase (where monkeys were allowed to choose
between the two brands in the absence of price). However, at the
end of the price condition, we added an additional phase, a price
manipulation check phase.
In the price learning phase, monkeys were taught that one
brand was expensive (for each token the monkeys got only one
cup/Crunch Berry), while the other brand was cheap, (for each
token the monkeys got three cups/Crunch Berries). The price
learning phase consisted of one session with 16 trials with pro-
cedures identical to the price learning phase of Experiment 3.
After monkeys completed the price learning phase, theymoved
on to the price preference assessment phase, where we aimed to
determine whether the prices of the two brands impacted prefer-
ences. The price preference assessment was performed over four
sessions, each consisting of a set of 8 reminder trials (identical to
the original price learning phase trials), and 16 test trials. Note
that we doubled the number of reminder trials from Experiment
3 to ensure that the monkeys would remember the prices of
the two brands. After reminder trials were complete, a differ-
ent experimenter (blind to condition) gave the monkeys a choice
between the two brands of cups in the absence of any tokens. As
in Experiment 3, monkeys chose between the two brands of cups
now offering one Crunch Berry each. Again, if monkeys devel-
oped a preference for the more expensive Crunch Berry brand
after learning its price, then they should selectively choose the
expensive brand over the cheap brand in these trials.
We then moved on to the price manipulation check phase. This
phase served to reaffirm that the monkeys were paying atten-
tion to the price of the two Crunch Berry brands. Specifically,
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we expected that when the monkeys had to pay for the two
brands using their tokens, they would take price information into
account and therefore choose the cheap brand (which gave them
the most food). The price manipulation check phase consisted of
four sessions, each containing 8 reminder trials (identical to the
original price learning phase trials) and 16 manipulation check
test trials. In these test trials, the monkeys had to use their tokens
and choose between the expensive brand (which gave only one
cup/Crunch Berry per token) and the cheap brand (which offered
three cups/Crunch Berries per token). These trials began when
the two branded experimenters dropped a token into the enclo-
sure before moving to opposite sides. After a synchronized count,
the two experimenters turned around, allowing the monkey to
choose to trade the token for either the cheap brand or the expen-
sive brand. Monkeys who attend to price should choose to buy the
cheap brand more often than the expensive brand since the cheap
brand gives them more food overall.
As in Experiment 3, the delay conditionmirrored the price con-
dition (a delay learning phase, a delay preference assessment phase,
and a delay manipulation check phase) with only one key differ-
ence: instead of varying the price of the two brands, we instead
varied the delay time the monkeys needed to wait in order to
receive each brand: one brand was associated with a 30 s delay
(the “expensive delay”), while the other was given immediately
(the “cheap delay”).
RESULTS
We first tested whether monkeys showed a preference in the price
preference assessment phase. As in all previous experiments, we
saw that monkeys as a group did not show a preference for the
expensive good [t(5) = 1.32, p = 0.25]. Two monkeys showed
preferences for the color associated with a cheap price (percent
choice of expensive: HR: 31%, p = 0.004; NN: 36%, p = 0.03)
and all other monkeys showed no preference (FL: 48%, p = 0.90;
HG: 42%, p = 0.26; JM: 61%, p = 0.10; MP: 48%; p = 0.90). In
the pricemanipulation check phase, monkeys as a group showed a
preference for the cheap good [t(5) = 18.81, p < 0.0001]. Indeed,
all monkeys individually showed a preference for the cheap good
(Preference for expensive symbol: FL: 6%, p < 0.0001; HR: 0%,
p < 0.0001; HG: 6%, p < 0.0001; JM: 0%, p < 0.0001; NN: 0%,
p < 0.0001; MP: 15%, p < 0.0001). Comparing monkeys’ perfor-
mance across the two phases also revealed a significant effect of
phase [t(5) = 8.86, p = 0.0003], suggesting that although mon-
keys attend to which good is more expensive when they must
spend their tokens, the same subjects do not prefer the expensive
brand when they can freely choose between the two brands.
We then explored how monkeys performed on the delay pref-
erence assessment. Overall, monkeys showed no preference for
the delayed good [t(5) = 0.74, p = 0.49]. One monkey showed
a significant preference in the opposite direction (preference to
delayed good: NN: 36%, p = 0.03), but all other monkeys did not
show any statistically significant preference (FL: 61%, p = 0.10;
HR: 53%, p = 0.71; HG: 50%, p = 1.0; JM: 44%, p = 0.38; MP:
39%; p = 0.10). Even though monkeys did not show a preference
for the delayed good, as a group they showed a significant pref-
erence for the immediate reward during the delay manipulation
check phase [t(5) = 5.12, p = 0.004]. Individually, four monkeys
showed a significant preference for the immediate reward (pref-
erence to the delayed reward: FL: 4%, p < 0.0001; HR: 19%,
p < 0.0001; JM: 23%, p = 0.0002; MP: 8%, p = 0.0001), but two
other monkeys’ performance was not statistically significant (HG:
38%, p = 0.11; NN: 35%, p = 0.06). Comparing monkeys’ per-
formance across the delay preference assessment phase and the
delay manipulation check phase revealed a significant effect of
phase [t(5) = 3.27, p = 0.02]. Monkeys attended to which brand
was the delayed brand in the manipulation check, yet they still
formed no preference for the brand previously associated with
delay when they had the chance to get both brands immediately.
DISCUSSION
We had two main goals in Experiment 4. Our first goal was to
examine whether the use of a familiar reward in Experiment
3 had prevented monkeys from show pricing and delay effects.
Experiment 4 dealt with this issue by testing whether monkeys
showed delay and pricing effects for food rewards that were both
unfamiliar and easily distinguished (differently colored Crunch
Berries). Despite this methodological change, we observed the
same pattern of performance as in Experiment 3: capuchins
showed no preference for the more expensive brand in either the
price or delay condition.
The second goal of Experiment 4 was to determine whether
the monkeys were in fact tracking the prices and delays that were
associated with the two different brands. To assess this, we added
a manipulation check in both the price and delay conditions.
These manipulation checks revealed that monkeys were accu-
rately tracking which brand was expensive in terms of both delay
and price, yet the same subjects’ preferences were unaffected by
these cues.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across four experiments, capuchins did not moderate their pref-
erences with regard to price. In Experiment 1, capuchins showed
no preference for the more expensive piece of ice. In Experiment
2, capuchins showed no preference for the more expensive color
of gelatin, regardless of prior exposure. In Experiments 3 and 4,
capuchins showed no preference for the more expensive brand
of cereal. Across several studies, however, capuchins consistently
passed manipulations checks showing that they understood the
price associated with each of the two goods involved. Taken
together, these findings imply that capuchins do not show a
human-like pricing effect—learning the price of a good does not
change the capuchins’ preference for that good.
In addition, these results suggest that capuchins’ prefer-
ences may not be affected by other factors—such as delay
information—either. Across Experiments 3 and 4, capuchins also
failed to update their preferences for different foods based on
the delay they were required to wait for that food. This lack of
a preference for delayed rewards conflicts with previous studies
demonstrating that human and non-human species do—at least
in some cases—prefer stimuli associated with additional time or
effort (DiGian et al., 2004; Pompilio and Kacelnik, 2005; Zentall
and Singer, 2007; Wanat et al., 2010; see Zentall, 2010 for a
review). It’s worth noting, however, that the general preference
for longer delays is likely to be less robust than the preference for
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higher priced goods—a growing body of studies demonstrate that
human and non-human participants do not always show effort
and delay justification effects (Vasconcelos et al., 2007; Arantes
and Grace, 2008; Shibasaki and Kawai, 2008, 2011; Vasconcelos
and Urcuioli, 2009). In addition, there are many situations in
which humans and animals tend not to show delay justification
effects; indeed, the literature on discounting effects in humans
and animals suggests that both of these populations often prefer
cases in which delays are shorter rather than longer (see review of
this work in Stevens, 2010). For this reason, it is possible that our
subjects might show other effects on value manipulation in future
studies despite not showing the delay effects we hypothesized
here. Nonetheless, the results of the current study still provide
hints that delay and other effects on preferences may be less robust
than previously thought.
Another potential problemwith our study concerns howmon-
keys were presented with price information in their experimental
token economy. As in previous studies (e.g., Chen et al., 2006;
Lakshminarayanan et al., 2011), we communicated the price of
a good to monkeys by changing the amount of that good that
monkeys received for a single token. While this way of indicating
price information has been validated in previous work (see Chen
et al., 2006 for evidence that monkeys obey the tenets of standard
price theory when tested using this method), it also resulted in a
methodological worry: when learning the price of different goods,
monkeys always received more of the “cheaper” good than of the
more expensive one. In this way, monkeys inadvertently wound
up having more experience with cheap vs. expensive items. We
attempted to deal with this potential confound in several ways.
First, we ran all preference assessment phases on different days
than we taught monkeys the price of the different goods. In this
way, we hoped that if monkeys became satiated on the cheaper
good during the price learning phases, this would not extend to
their preference choices since preference assessments were run on
separate days than exposure to cheap and expensive goods. In
addition, some of our studies used foods that are very familiar
to monkeys (e.g., Kix) so that differential exposure in our stud-
ies would be trumped by the monkeys’ previous experience with
these foods. Nevertheless, it’s worth noting that this differential
exposure across cheap and expensive conditions is one confound
in our studies that could potentially have influenced the lack of
pricing effects we observed.
Based on the control and experimental conditions used, we
can rule out a number of reasons for why the monkeys might
not be showing a human-like pricing effect. First, our control
conditions demonstrate that monkeys’ lack of preference is not
due to an inability to understand price. In Experiment 2, sub-
jects showed that they understood the price of the two goods;
in the price shift control condition, subjects spent more of their
tokens on a good that was “on sale” than on an equivalent good
that was not. This replicates previously published findings (e.g.,
Chen et al., 2006) showing that capuchins can both track price
and use price information in their purchasing decisions. In addi-
tion, other control conditions revealed that capuchins successfully
track the price and delay associated with different brands of
goods. In Experiment 4, capuchins chose to buy a cheap brand
over an expensive brand, and an immediate brand over a delayed
brand, suggesting that subjects successfully use both price and
delay information in their purchasing decisions even though they
do not use these factors to form their preferences. Finally, our
control conditions rule out the possibility that capuchins failed
to show pricing effects because their prior experiences anchored
their subsequent preferences. In Experiment 2, we established
that capuchin monkeys failed to show a price effect regardless of
whether they had previous experience with the foods serving as
goods.
Overall, then, our findings suggest that capuchin monkeys
perform very differently than humans when interacting with dif-
ferently priced goods. Although humans regularly prefer goods
that are higher in price, capuchin monkeys appear to show no
such effect. This pattern of performance is relatively surpris-
ingly for two reasons. First, our results suggest that capuchins
fail to fall prey to arbitrary price information when deciding
between different goods. Our failure to observe pricing effects in
capuchins is also surprising in light of the fact that this species
exhibits a number of other classic judgment and decision-making
biases, such as the endowment effect (Lakshminarayanan et al.,
2008), loss aversion (Chen et al., 2006), and the reflection effect
(Lakshminarayanan et al., 2011). Indeed, to our knowledge, the
price effect is the first judgment and decision-making heuristic to
have been studied in non-human primates and not observed. Our
results therefore suggest that pricing effects may rely on mecha-
nisms that are distinct from those involved in these other biases.
Indeed, our results suggest that pricing effects may be due to
cognitive mechanisms or specific experiences that are uniquely
human.
One uniquely human experience that could give rise to
human-specific pricing effects is our species’ practice of partici-
pating in markets in which there is often an association between
price and value. In a free market, companies can only charge what
people are willing to pay for their goods. As such, in most human
markets, there will often be an association between a good’s price
and its actual quality. Humans may thus generalize these experi-
ences to falsely believe the price of an item is always indicative of
its quality. Under this potential explanation, we might not expect
capuchin monkeys to show a similar effect since the markets
they trained in are not markets that have associations between
price and quality. In this way, our findings have narrowed down
the kinds of human-specific experiences that likely lead to price
effects.
The goal of these studies was to gain insight into the mecha-
nisms underlying pricing effects in humans. Although we know
much about how and when these effects occur, little work to date
had addressed where these effects come from in the first place. By
comparing our own biases to those of capuchinmonkeys, we hope
to have shed light on the mechanisms underlying human pric-
ing effects. Indeed, we have observed that—in contrast to other
decision-making biases—pricing effects may be uniquely human.
Our results therefore hint that monkeys may choose between
goods simply based on their experience with different items rather
than using the sorts of arbitrary factors that humans use.
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